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1. Introduction 
Minimum wage setting is a well established labor market policy in Latin 
American countries. Its rationality is associated with redistribution objectives 
(Freeman, 1996), on the one hand, and to solving informational problems in 
the labor market, on the other (Card and Krueger, 1995). Under the former 
objective, policy intervention is justified as a means to improve the situation of 
the poorest among wage earners. This may be a response to problems of 
demand concentration (monopsony) or unequal distribution of power between 
employers and workers. In the latter case, the idea is to produce signals for a 
market in which information asymmetry problems or difficulties in measuring 
worker productivity may be significant. 
Under perfect competition and full compliance a binding minimum wage 
raises average employed worker earnings, but lowers employment. This is an 
important consideration for policy, though not all empirical results validate it. 
Full compliance with labor regulations, or anything near that, however, is 
unknown of in Latin America. All Latin American countries, to a greater or 
lesser degree, feature informal sectors of a significant size. This makes 
theoretical predictions less certain. Why would informal firms comply with 
minimum wage laws? Are they not by definition out of the reach of labor 
legislation? In practice, the simple duality formal-informal has many different 
shades: firms are more formal in some aspects than others. They tend to 
comply more with certain legislation than with other. Risk of detection may 
play a role, but other institutional factors may too — legitimacy, reasonability, 
or plain custom. 
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Understandably, minimum wage regulation has great appeal among 
politicians. If indeed it fulfills its promise of increasing the welfare of low 
income people, then it is a powerful policy tool. However, this is by no means 
granted. Particularly, there is no large body of evidence on what minimum 
wages do in settings where compliance is far from perfect. Understanding the 
effects of minimum wages in developing countries needs an understanding of 
its effects in both formal and informal sectors. So far, however, we have little 
evidence on this. Our objective here is to contribute to fill this gap by 
analyzing the effects of a minimum wage in a setting characterized by 
substantial non-compliance with labor legislation. 
A handful of studies for developing countries have been produced that 
explicitly address the issue of differentiated effects in the formal and informal 
sectors - Bell (1997) for Mexico; Gindling and Terrell (2004) for Costa Rica; 
Lemos (2004) and Fajnzylber (2001) for Brazil; Jones (1997) for Ghana; and 
Maloney and Nuñez (2004) for Colombia. One surprising conclusion of this 
literature is that the minimum wage has significant effects in the informal 
sector. Further, some of these studies find larger effects in the informal than in 
the formal sector. This finding has been interpreted as evidence of a signaling 
(lighthouse) effect of the minimum wage. This idea was first proposed by Card 
and Krueger (1995) in their study of the fast food industry in the United States. 
In that context, it served the purpose of providing a rationale for the 
unorthodox finding of positive or nil employment effects of minimum wage 
increases. Contrastingly, in the case of Latin America it has been put forward 
even when employment effects are found to be strongly negative (Maloney 
and Nuñez, 2004; Fajnzylver, 2001). Consequently, perceived fairness 
considerations are thought to be associated with it, instead of the efficiency 
ones proposed by Card and Krueger. Of course, whether employers attach ‘fair 
pay’ attributes to official minimum wages has to do more with local conditions 
than with universal rationality. Thus, empirical responses may vary from 
country to country. 
Peru provides an intriguing setting to evaluate the impact of minimum 
wage policies when compliance is incomplete and endogenous, for several 
reasons. First, it has a very large urban informal sector even for Latin 
American standards. No less than 60 percent of urban workers are estimated to 
belong to the informal sector. Second, it is different from other countries in the 
region in that minimum wage policy has followed an erratic course since the 
late eighties, when it lost efficacy due to hyperinflation. This is quite different 
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from other Latin American countries studied in the literature, where 
readjustments are periodical and institutional mechanisms for revising levels 
operate. This has one important methodological implication: changes are 
largely unanticipated. On the other hand, it may have consequences on the 
effectiveness of any potential signaling effect, if only because predictable 
signals are easier to follow. 
In order to test for minimum wage effects on earnings and employment in 
both formal and informal sectors we use two approaches. First, we estimate 
kernel density functions for monthly earnings distributions, focusing on key 
points in the recent evolution of minimum wages, starting in 1996. This 
provides some intuition on the role of the legal wage floor in the earnings 
distributions. Next, we use quarterly panel data to econometrically estimate 
effects of a minimum wage change on wages and the probability of remaining 
employed. We follow Neumark et al. (2000) empirical setting in controlling 
for worker position on the wage distribution, but adapt it to Peruvian data. In 
addition, we find evidence of a ‘regression to the mean’ problem and proceed 
to correct it. 
Results indicate that though the minimum wage plays a role in the shape of 
long run earnings distributions for both formal and informal workers, this role 
is stronger for formal workers. Analysis of the short run effects of the last 
minimum wage increase using quarterly panel data offers little support for 
numeraire or ‘lighthouse’ effects. Labor monthly earnings are affected only at 
the bottom of the distribution (0.25-0.60 of the minimum wage), made up 
mostly of informal workers; and for formal workers earning between the old 
and the new minima. Negative effects on the probability of retaining employed 
status are weak or non significant for informal wage earners below the 
minimum wage, but significant for formal workers ‘trapped’ between minima, 
and for both formal and informal earning just above and up to 2 times the 
minimum wage. Independent workers below minimum suffer weakly 
significant to significant negative effects on employment, but no significant 
effect on earnings. 
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the 
relevant literature is discussed, with particular focus on differentiating effects 
in formal and informal sectors. Next, in section 3 we describe the institutional 
setting of minimum wage policy in Peru and analyze the recent evolution of 
the statutory minimum wage. In section 4 we briefly describe the 
methodological approaches. Section 5 details the methodology used in 
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estimating the kernel distributions. Results are also presented and discussed. 
Sections 6 through 8 do likewise with the econometric approach. We conclude 
in section 9. 
2. Literature discussion  
Continued academic interest on the effects of minimum wages has different 
sources. First, it has the attraction of simplicity in putting theory to test: it 
provides a textbook example of interference with the price-setting mechanism. 
Second, it has potential distributional effects, so policy implications are 
warranted. Third, empirical findings are the object of controversy. In the 
simplest textbook model, a binding minimum wage is a rigidity that causes 
unemployment. A worker is paid the value of her/his marginal productivity. A 
minimum wage above this level forces firms to lay off those workers below 
that productivity level. If there exists full compliance, and holding technology 
constant, possible adjustment variables are employment and hours worked 
(including substitutions between full-timers and part-timers). Also, the change 
in relative prices may induce substitutions away from low-skilled labor 
towards higher-skilled labor. In countries where compliance is partial, many 
informal firms will ignore the change, while another possible adjustment 
margin is the transition from formal to informal hiring. 
Rationale for minimum wage laws is associated to market failure and/or to 
redistributive goals. On the first count, it is argued that in practice wage setting 
presents anomalies in relation to the theoretical model. For example, persistent 
differences in the earnings of virtually identical workers are found even in the 
least sophisticated occupations: some industries pay more for their janitors 
than others.4 From the perspective of market failure, the strongest theoretical 
underpinning for minimum wages derives from the presumed existence of 
monopsonies (Card and Krueger, 1995). Beyond the one company-town 
caricature, it is argued that the presence of job-switching costs provides a 
degree of monopsony power to employers. As long as information on job 
opportunities and working conditions is scarce, job-switching costs are 
significant. Within this context, minimum wage signaling (the so called 
lighthouse effect), may contribute to labor market efficiency. Also, especially 
                                                 
4  This is the case of the US car industry vis-á-vis the service sector (Card and Krueger 1995: 153-4). 
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in inflationary and distorted relative price settings, agents may interpret 
minimum wage hikes as a signal that prices and wages are open to bargain. 
On the redistribution front, it is argued that minimum wages have the 
potential to moderately affect the wage distribution by improving the earnings 
of those at the bottom of the labor income scale (Freeman, 1996). If this may 
be accomplished at low cost in terms of job losses, then it might be a 
worthwhile policy. The evaluation of this policy instrument, however, has to 
consider the relative strength of two opposite effects (higher earnings versus 
lower employment). What types of adjustments prevail when a minimum wage 
hike occurs is entirely an empirical matter, and one quite intensely debated as 
well. In the past decade Card and Krueger (1995) have animated the debate by 
presenting evidence, surprising in the light of the competitive market model, 
that if the minimum wage had any effect on employment, this was positive. 
Although in a few cases these results have been replicated and theoretical 
models to justify them produced (Dickens, et al. 1999), empirical research has 
tended not to reproduce these results. Castillo-Freeman and Freeman (1996), 
for example, found strong negative effects of a substantial minimum wage 
increase in Puerto Rico. Neumark et al. (2000) for the United States and 
Abowd et al. (1999) for United States and France have also identified 
considerable unemployment effects. Kertesi and Köllo (2004) and Rama 
(2000) have also found strong negative consequences on employment of large 
increases in minimum wages in Hungary and Indonesia, respectively. 
For Latin America, Bell (1997) found no aggregate employment effects in 
1980s Mexico, where the minimum wage was low, but large effects in 
Colombia (elasticities between -0.2 and -1.2 for low wage workers), where its 
level is closer to the average wage in the formal sector. More recently, 
Maloney and Nuñez (2004) found similarly negative effects on employment, 
using a different methodology. Following Neumark et al. (2000), they use 
quarterly panel data to analyze both the percent change in hourly wages and 
the probability of becoming unemployed considering the worker’s position in 
the wage distribution. They find the expected positive effect on wages and 
negative on the probability of retaining employment. These effects go way 
beyond those trapped between the former and the new minima, suggesting 
numeraire effects across the wage distribution. For Brazil, Fajnzylver (2001), 
also using Neumark et al. (2000) empirical setting, finds significant effects of 
the predicted sign on wages, running through the wage distribution, and 
employment. 
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Few authors have focused on minimum wage effects on the formal and 
informal sectors. Gintling and Terrell (2004) have analyzed effects on wages 
in Costa Rica. They define different informal sectors in both urban and rural 
areas, finding that minimum wage increases affect both formal and informal 
sectors. Further, effects are found to be strongest in the rural informal sector, 
although only somewhat weak effects are identified in the urban informal 
sector. Bell (1997) also found larger effects in the informal than in the formal 
sector in Mexico. Lemos (2004) also finds significant effects of the minimum 
wage in the Brazilian informal sector. Again for Brazil, Fajnzylver (2001) 
estimates similar effects on earnings for registered (formal) and unregistered 
(informal) workers, running through the wage distribution. Unemployment 
effects are also important and tend to be stronger for informal workers 
(elasticities going from -.35 to -.25) than for formal workers (-.16 to -.09). 
Maloney and Nuñez (2004) estimate kernel distributions for different Latin 
American countries, finding that in virtually all countries considered there is 
some influence on the informal sector. In Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and 
Paraguay the influence of the minimum wage seems far stronger in the 
informal than in the formal sector. Thus, they conclude that the minimum 
wage is an important “benchmark” for establishing ‘fair’ pay. In sum, 
available evidence clearly indicates that in Latin America minimum wage 
effects go beyond the formal sector of the economy. 
Conceptually, in a context of widespread non-compliance with labor 
regulations, a minimum wage could still have an effect if it provides useful 
information to market agents, who subsequently adjust current wages. On this 
respect, one interesting aspect is that while Card and Krueger (1995) use this 
idea to explain their unorthodox result of zero to positive employment effects, 
in the case of evidence from Latin America what is obtained is substantially 
negative effects on employment. Thus, whereas for the United States one may 
argue, as Card and Krueger have, that the minimum wage has an efficiency-
enhancing effect, in Latin America if there is any such effect, it is not 
sufficient to prevent employment from falling. The alternative explanation 
proposed, which necessarily departs from efficiency considerations and moves 
into the ideological realm, is that economic agents attach a notion of fairness 
to legal minimum wages (Maloney and Nuñez, 2004). Were this so, one would 
expect that minimum wages may be binding even within the informal sector. 
In this case, in addition to being a formal institution, official minimum 
wages, would qualify as an ‘informal institution’ in the sense of Douglass 
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North (North, 1990: 4). The preservation of this institution would require that 
agents perceive the minimum wage as legitimate and reasonable, and 
internalize adjustments in its level as part of a normal labor relation. This, in 
turn, suggests several conditions should be met: 
• There must be a validated tradition of minimum wage regulation. 
• Minimum wage adjustments must occur in regular predictable intervals 
(even if the decided adjustment equals zero). 
• The adjustment process must be institutionalized, that is, there should be 
a legitimate political agency (or set of agencies) in charge of analyzing 
and deciding on the adjustment margins. 
From this perspective, compliance with minimum wage legislation is 
endogenous to both the minimum wage level, a point already made by 
Freeman (1993), among others, and to the institutional features of its 
implementation. Consequently, local conditions in which the policy is 
implemented are relevant and the question of minimum wage effects in the 
informal sector is thus an empirical one. Peru provides an interesting, as well 
as intriguing, setting to test for these effects for several reasons. First, it has a 
very large urban informal sector even for Latin American standards: less than 
one-third of private sector wage earners enjoy social security coverage 
(Jaramillo, 2003). Second, minimum wage regulation in the last decade has 
been erratic and unpredictable, in sharp contrast with other Latin American 
countries for which analysis has been done. Finally, these features provide 
confidence in that changes in the legal minimum have had an unanticipated 
character, which is more difficult to argue in the case of other countries. 
3. Minimum wages in Peru 
3.1 Institutional features 
Minimum wages were used in Peru for the first time in 1914 and since then 
they have been a standard part of labor policy. Since 1985 there is one single 
minimum wage that applies at the national level to all wage earners in the 
private sector. The Ministry of Labor was in charge of determining the 
minimum wage level until 2001, when the National Work Council (Consejo 
Nacional del Trabajo – CNT)), a tripartite forum, was established. The law that 
created the CNT gave it the power to set and adjust minimum wage levels, but 
so far it has not used it. In practice, minimum wage setting and readjusting has 
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been a decision of the president. In fact, the last minimum wage hike was 
announced by the president and then sent to the CNT for approval. No 
agreement was reached there and the Ministry of Labor passed the law 
anyway. This is consistent with the recent history of minimum wage 
adjustments: there is no institutional mechanism at work to periodically revise 
the minimum wage level. 
The hyperinflation period in the late eighties was a watershed for minimum 
wage policies. In the last years of the 1980s hyperinflation made minimum 
wage revisions very frequent - monthly and even bi-weekly adjustments - were 
the rule. All the same, the legal minimum wage, as well as mean wages, 
declined dramatically. With the reduction of inflation rates and the set in of 
structural adjustment, regular revisions were abandoned. After 1991 and until 
the end of the first of Fujimori’s presidential periods there were only two 
readjustments, even when annual inflation was still at the two-digit level 
throughout. This meant that the real value of the minimum wage tended to 
decline until the mid-nineties. 
When many analysts of the Peruvian labor market thought that the 
minimum wage was no longer part of the policy instruments, it made an 
extraordinary comeback during Fujimori’s second period. In a period of less 
than one year four increases were enacted, coinciding with a period of rapidly 
declining support for Fujimori’s regime. These increases amounted to a 161 
percent hike in real terms in a lapse of twelve months. After this hectic season, 
however, no additional hikes were implemented until March 2000, when in the 
middle of the presidential race, another increase came. After that there has 
been only one additional increase by Toledo’s administration, in September 
2003. This recent history of minimum wage policy in Peru serves to illustrate 
the most salient features of the institutional environment in which this policy is 
executed. These features have tended to undermine the credibility and 
legitimacy of the policy instrument and may well account for the seemingly 
odd result in the light of the experience of other Latin American countries, of 
no ‘lighthouse’ effect. 
In effect, Peru has not pursued a minimum wage policy in a consistent 
manner. This is reflected in at least two aspects of policy implementation. 
First, adjustments in the level of the minimum wage have been sporadic and 
followed no clear time pattern after the hyperinflation period. Thus, most 
increases during the last decade (four out of six) have concentrated in the lapse 
of one year (October 1996 to September 1997). BID (2004) puts Peru among 
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the three countries in the region with the greatest minimum wage volatility. In 
addition, adjustments have tended to come at politically sensitive periods, and 
thus have tended to be interpreted by public opinion as political gestures rather 
than serious policy decisions. Second, there has been no attempt to 
institutionalize a procedure to revise minimum wage levels periodically. 
Allocating power to do so to the CNT so far has been a hollow gesture, since it 
is presidential will that still dominates decisions in this regard, as the process 
for the last adjustment clearly indicates. As a result of these features, minimum 
wage regulation has been a highly erratic policy and, thus, quite unpredictable. 
3.2 Recent trends in the minimum wage 
As shown in Figure 1, the value of the minimum wage reached its peak in 
1987, after which it fell drastically, along with wages in general, until the 
beginning of the 1990s. This is related to the process of hyperinflation. From 
1991 to 1996, its value has tended to decline, following a pattern of inflation 
erosion with two discrete increases in 1992 and 1994 (see Figure 2). In a 
twelve-month period between 1996 and 1997, however, it increased 
dramatically, nearing the level of average pay for both informal and unskilled 
workers. A new increase was enacted in March 2000, as the presidential 
election approached. Three years later the current government made a 12% 
increase whereby the wage floor reached its current value of 460 new soles. 
Adjustments to the minimum wage in the nineties were different from those 
in the previous decade in that they were not part of a salary indexation policy. 
Thus, they were not associated with changes in objective indicators (like 
inflation), and they have been greater than accumulated inflation. There has 
not been any systematic relation with GDP growth either. Likewise, although 
the minimum wage shows a positive relationship with mean salaries for 
Metropolitan Lima, its increments in the past decade have been much larger 
than the growth in earnings of unskilled labor, which are an appropriate point 
of reference, since this sector is potentially the most affected by this type of 
regulation (see Figure 1). The increase has also surpassed that of earnings in 
the informal sector, which should be a benchmark in the determination of an 
appropriate level of minimum wage that does not reduce employment 
formality. 
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Figure 1: Metropolitan Lima: Evolution of minimum wage 
and real average. Monthly earnings of unskilled and informal 
workers (1994 nuevos soles) 
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Figure 2: Metropolitan Lima: Ratio minimum / average wage, 
and percentage of non compliance with the minimum wage*  
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In this way, since 1996 the ratio of minimum to mean wage has 
consistently increased, as Figure 2 illustrates. Also, a positive correlation 
between this ratio and the level of non-compliance is observed. Thus, during 
the past decade the percentage of salaried workers that earned less than the 
minimum has maintained an increasing tendency. At the beginning of the 
present decade, approximately 40% of full time salaried workers in 
Metropolitan Lima, the highest productivity region of the country, earned less 
than minimum wage. 
How do these indicators compare with those of other countries in the 
region? Using the ratio of the minimum wage to the median salary, BID 
(2004) places Peru among the five countries with the highest minimum wage 
levels, only below Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Colombia and Venezuela. In 
addition, Peru stands out in Latin America as far as non-compliance with 
minimum wage regulations goes. Data from the same source shows that at the 
end of the nineties, with 24% of workers between 26 and 40 years, who work 
no less than 30 hours per week, Peru is among the countries with the highest 
levels of non-compliance, only below Nicaragua and Colombia5. However, if 
we focus on private wage earners, as shown in Figure 2, the number for 
Metropolitan Lima is closer to 40 percent. In some countries, as diverse as 
Argentina, Bolivia and Mexico, this index is lower than 5%. The level of non 
compliance is associated with the minimum wage position related to average 
salary, but is also linked with the general institutional environment. Chile, for 
example, has a ratio of minimum wage to average salary only slightly below 
that of Peru, but its level of non-compliance is only 7%. 
From this overview of the minimum wage in Peru, one can conclude that, 
in relation to average or median salary in the economy, it is above the average 
for Latin America, closer to the higher-level countries than to the lower-level 
ones. Non-compliance is among the highest in the region as well. The effects 
on worker earnings and employment are related to both characteristics; 
however, it is not clear what type of effects we should expect. On the one 
hand, these features are similar to those of Colombia, so one may be inclined 
to expect that the same type of effects prevail. On the other hand, Peru is very 
different from Colombia in the way minimum wage policies are implemented. 
                                                 
5 BID, 2004: table 7.2. Note that workers younger than 26 are excluded, though they have legally the same 
right to receive no less than the minimum wage, and it is potentially the main affected group. 
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In the following sections, we deal with the empirical estimation of these 
effects. 
4. Methodological approach 
In order to evaluate the effects of minimum wage increases on earnings and 
employment we use two approaches that are well-known in the literature. First, 
we estimate kernel density functions for the distribution of workers’ earnings, 
around different inflexion points in the recent evolution of minimum wages, 
starting in 1996. This graphic analysis allows us to illustrate how the minimum 
wage has moved towards the center of the earnings distribution for the 
informal sector, while providing some intuition on the role of the minimum 
wage in the earnings distribution as well as on the effects of minimum wage 
changes. Second, we use panel data to carry out an econometric analysis in 
order to estimate effects of a minimum wage shock on both wages and the 
probability of retaining employment. The identification strategy rests on 
comparing quarterly transitions affected by a minimum wage increase and 
those not affected. 
5. Effects on the distribution of real monthly earnings 
In this section we evaluate changes in earnings dispersion through the 
estimation of kernel density functions. The kernel estimation process in its 
basic form consists of disseminating the observed value of a point in its own 
neighborhood, through a function that is usually the Gaussian or the 
Epanechnikov. In this way, the kernel estimation of the density function that 
generates data is constructed like a weighted sum of the calculated values with 
a K function in the following manner:  
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We have used the same bandwidth for all the estimated distributions. The 
exact bandwidth (h), 0.15, was selected in order to identify the multiple modes 
in the distribution of monthly income data. Also, optimal bandwidths 
incorporated in the statistical package tend to over smooth the observed 
distribution. 
Graphic analysis allows us to look at minimum wage effects in two 
different ways. First, we can focus on the role of the minimum wage in the 
earnings distribution in the long run, and, second, we can examine how the 
distribution changes (or not) when the legal minimum changes. On the first 
front, we look at earnings distributions at least two years after the most recent 
change in the wage floor. These are presented in Figure 3. We start with a 
minimum wage set at a low level, about 40 percent of average earnings in the 
informal sector, in 1996 (top panel). At this point, the minimum wage is 
largely non-binding in the formal sector, so no effect is apparent on the 
earnings distribution of that sector. In the informal sector distribution, 
however, one can perceive a jump around the minimum wage level, suggesting 
that at that point it may have been a relevant benchmark for this sector. 
In 1999, with the floor at a significantly higher level -1.4 times in real 
terms-, non-compliance has increased in both formal and informal sectors. It is 
difficult to identify an effect on the distribution in the informal sector, because 
even though a spike crosses the minimum wage line, it is not clear whether the 
distribution would look any different without a legal minimum wage. In the 
formal sector there is a small cliff, but the shape of the distribution does not 
seem to be dramatically affected by the minimum. Finally, in 2003, 3.5 years 
after the previous increase, the distributions for both formal and informal 
sectors show steep cliffs around the minimum wage level, suggesting a role for 
the minimum wage in shaping the distributions. 
Summing up, when the minimum wage is at a low level, it seems to affect 
primarily the distribution of earnings in the informal sector. It is also fair to 
say that when the minimum wage is binding, it has an effect on the distribution 
of monthly earnings of formal sector workers. Evidence seems somewhat less 
conclusive on whether there is an effect in the informal sector. However, 
considering that the data set is better for 2003, where the role of the minimum 
wage is clearer, one may conclude that there are long run effects in the 
informal sector as well.6
                                                 
6 See Appendix for the size of the different data sets used. 
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Two additional points are worth noting. One, the graphs show very clearly 
how the minimum wage has shifted from far on the left to close to the center 
of the earnings distributions for the informal sector in a rather short period of 
time. Two, when comparing the distributions over time, it would seem that 
concentration has increased, as shown by the central mode reaching vertically 
beyond the 1.0 mark. This is also validated by the change in the coefficient of 
variation (standard deviation / mean), which moves from around 0.7 in 1997 to 
0.55 in 2003. 
Figure 3: Kernel distributions of private sector workers monthly 
earnings, Metropolitan Lima 
  1996              1999 
 
0 
.2 
.4 
.6 
.8 
1 
Kernel density
3 4 5 6 7 8
monthly income (log)
informal salaried 1996 formal salaried 1996
 
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
Kernel density
4 5 6 7 8 
monthly income (log)
informal salaried 1999 formal salaried 1999 
 
Note: Vertical lines represent the current minimum wage 
Source: ENAHO 1996-III. 
 
Graphic analysis can also provide some intuition as to what happens in the 
short run when the minimum wage level changes. Figure 4 presents earnings 
distributions before and after a change in the legal minimum wage. Looking at 
the top panel, the 1996-1997 hikes, which moved the minimum from a low, 
largely non binding, to a rather high level, do not seem to have any clear effect 
on the informal sector distribution. Contrastingly, in the formal sector the 
distribution moves to the right and shows a cliff around the new level. The 
2003 increase produced a move to the right in both sector distributions, but 
more pronounced in the case of the formal sector. In the informal sector the 
slope of the cliff close to the initial minimum wage line declines, moving to 
the right, but not much change can be detected around the new minimum wage 
line and further up the distribution. In the case of the formal sector, the cliff 
 
MINIMUM WAGE EFFECTS UNDER ENDOGENOUS COMPLIANCE 99
around the initial minimum wage level moves to the right in a similar fashion, 
but in this case, a greater concentration around the new minimum can de 
identified. In sum, it seems that the formal sector earnings distribution adjusts 
in the short run to changes in the minimum wage, while the informal sector 
does not. 
 
Figure 4: Short run changes in earnings distributions following a 
minimum wage increase, Metropolitan Lima 
1996-1997 
 
Source: ENAHO III. 1996. 
 
2003-2004 
 
Note: Vertical lines represent the current minimum wage 
Source: INEI, EPE 2003-II 
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Graphic analysis seems to take us only so far. In order to more rigorously 
establish effects of the minimum wage we need to proceed with econometric 
analysis. 
6. Effects on earnings and employment: econometric analysis 
We use econometric analysis to estimate the effect of a change in the 
minimum wage on both monthly earnings and the probability of staying 
employed. The analysis focuses on three groups in the labor market: wage 
earners in the private formal sector, wage earners in the private informal 
sector, and independent workers. 
We follow Neumark et al. (2000) in controlling for the worker’s position in 
the earnings distribution. However, we depart from their empirical setting in 
several respects. One, we estimate short run effects only. This is a limitation 
imposed by the data, since we only have quarterly panels. The fact that 
turnover rates are typically higher and tenure lower in developing countries, 
and more so among workers earning around or below the minimum wage, 
suggests that this is not a serious limitation, although, of course, it would be 
desirable to test effects over a longer period of time. Also, our data cover the 
period 2002-2004, during which only one minimum wage increase was 
observed. In addition, the issue of overlapping effects of successive changes in 
the minimum wage is not relevant since the existing distance between the last 
increment of the minimum wage and the previous one is more than three years. 
Thus, we do not incorporate lagged effects in our specification. 
Finally, since quarterly inflation rates are extremely low during the period 
of analysis and we have only one change in the normative minimum wage (in 
September of 2003), the inclusion of the real variance of minimum wage as 
regressor would represent above all the price shocks that are not associated 
with seasonality or activity level (since the regression controls for both) and 
brings with it the risk of erroneously attributing effects to the change in the 
minimum wage or possible overestimation. 
The identification strategy consists of comparing “regular” worker 
transitions with others shocked by a minimum wage increase. The manner in 
which effects of a change in the legal wage floor are evaluated is by generating 
a dummy that identifies whether an individual worker that pertains to a 
determined income group faced a change in minimum wage in the period 
between observations. The following specifications are used:  
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for changes in monthly earnings from primary occupation, and 
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for changes in the probability of retaining employed status. 
 
X is a vector of individual characteristics (sex, age, education level), which 
capture the distinct occupational vulnerability or volatility of income between 
groups of individuals. The variable Z includes individual characteristics 
related to labor activity (number of workers in the firm, job tenure, etc.). T and 
Y control for changes in the economic environment. T consists of a group of 
dummy variables that indicates whether the observations of each individual 
correspond to the first and second trimester, second and third, etc. This 
variable captures the effect of the presumed seasonality present in the data. Y 
indicates variation in the activity level of the relevant sector for each 
individual. The indicator is the quarterly variation in GDP in the sector in 
which the individual worked during the first observation. Dj is a set of dummy 
variables that identify the earnings range in relation to the minimum wage in 
the initial period (0.25-0.6, 0.6-1.2, 1.2-1.5, etc.). The full set of ranges 
considered is in the Appendix. The 2-2.5 range is left out of the regression to 
avoid perfect multicolinearity; 11, mwwi is the labor income to minimum 
wage ratio for each individual. Finally, E identifies the individuals that 
confront the minimum wage shock, that is, those that were observed both 
before and after the minimum wage change. 
While  captures the effects of belonging to a particular range in the 
distribution of labor income, the coefficient of the interaction term between 
variables Dj and E, γ
jθ
j, informs us about the effect attributable to the minimum 
wage change on a particular group in the earnings distribution. This is the 
coefficient of central interest to our research. 
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Data  
Data used in this paper come from the Metropolitan Lima Permanent 
Employment Survey (EPE). The survey covers 49 districts in the provinces of 
Lima and Callao. The unit of observation is the dwelling and its occupants 
with habitual residency, excluding those that are members of the armed forces 
and collective households. The design structure of the EPE survey is quarterly, 
consisting of three consecutive monthly survey rounds. It includes a rotating 
panel. In this way, each selected household is interviewed twice a year in two 
consecutive quarters. The sample is renovated in such a way that between one 
mobile quarter and the next 17% of the total sample is new.  
The size of the monthly sample is approximately 1600 dwellings or 
households, within which 6500 individuals are interviewed on average. From 
this set of individuals the panel is constructed, 2100 (about a third) making up 
the panel portion of the sample. For this study, 25 of these panels have been 
used, adding up to a sample of 32410 employed individuals observed between 
March 2002 and December 2004.7 These 25 panels are those started in 2002, 
from March until December, and whose second observations went from June 
2002 until February 2003, respectively, plus, in a similar manner, the nine 
panels started in 2003 from March to December, whose second observation 
went from June 2003 to February 2004, respectively, plus, finally, the seven 
panels started in 2004 from March to September, whose second observation 
went from June 2004 to December 2004. Note that there are nine panels’ 
beginnings each year, since in March of each year the sample is completely 
renewed. The distribution of the sample by earnings ranges in relation to the 
minimum wage is presented in the Appendix, tables A2 and A3.  
7. Results 
Earnings 
Table 1 summarizes effects on the most likely affected groups. Full 
regression results are in the Appendix (first four columns of table A5). Two 
are the most striking results. First, effects are the strongest at the bottom range 
of the earnings distribution. In effect, it is on workers earning up to 0.6 of the 
                                                 
7 The survey was implemented in March 2001 with a panel that observed individuals for four consecutive 
quarters on that year. However, the absence of crucial data for our multivariate analysis, like the educational 
level of the individuals, made it necessary to exclude this segment of the panel for the purposes of this study. 
 
MINIMUM WAGE EFFECTS UNDER ENDOGENOUS COMPLIANCE 103 
minimum wage that impact is most significant. The direction of the effect runs 
counter for wage earners (+) and independent workers (-), however. 
Coefficients are large: a 12 percent variation in the minimum wage is 
associated with increases greater than 40 percent on informal salaried workers 
within this earnings range. Very few workers in the formal sector belong in 
this earnings range, so no significant effect is found for them. This also 
explains similar coefficients for the informal sector wage earners and for wage 
labor in the private sector generally. Effect on independent workers is also 
large, the implicit elasticity being around 1.5 in absolute value, but weakly 
significant. 
Table 1: Effects of the 12% increase of the minimum wage on monthly earnings 
(from regression output) 
 
Private  
Salaried 
 
Informal  
Private  
Salaried 
 Formal 
Private  
Salaried 
Independent 
Affect].25 - .6]*MW1 0.442 0.493  -0.194 
 (4.27)*** (4.27)***  (1.70)* 
Affect].6 - .95]*MW1 0.020 0.043  -0.076 
 (0.32) (0.60)  (0.92) 
Affect].95 - 1.2]*MW1 0.015 -0.040 0.164 -0.018 
 (0.32) (0.67) (2.03)** (0.18) 
Affect]1.2 - 1.5]*MW1 -0.044 -0.020 -0.077 -0.033 
 (1.09) (0.34) (1.38) (0.36) 
Affect]1.5 - 2]*MW1 -0.029 -0.032 -0.029 0.040 
 (0.80) (0.55) (0.63) (0.36) 
Affect]2 – 2.5]*MW1 -0.040 0.069 -0.111 -0.223 
 (0.84) (0.83) (1.97)** (1.49) 
Note: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant 
at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Second, effects on those caught between the previous and new minimum 
wage levels are only significant in the formal sector. The coefficient is more 
reasonable, but still quite high, the implicit elasticity above 1. No effects are 
found on informal sector wage earners in this earnings range. 
One concern with these results relates to the large coefficients for workers 
at the bottom of the wage distribution other than formal salaried. Were these 
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reflecting “true” elasticities, we could have at hands a powerful policy tool to 
redistribute income towards low-wage informal workers, though at the 
expense of similar low-income independent workers. One possible source of 
problems, however, may have to do with the earnings data, which might be 
producing a problem of regression towards the mean. This occurs because 
baseline values are negatively correlated with change, as individuals with low 
earnings will naturally improve theirs more than those with high earnings. The 
general statistical phenomenon has been well documented in bio-medical 
research, but paid much less attention in economic analyses.8 Although in our 
case it is to some extent limited by the presence of a control group, there may 
be chance imbalances at baseline that are not controlled for. 
We tested the ‘regression to the mean’ hypothesis through the following 
procedure. First, we ran a series of regressions “faking” minimum wage 
increases for every quarterly panel available in our data set. The conclusion is 
that regardless of the quarterly panel chosen as “affected” by the fake shock, 
significant coefficients for the group earning below 60% of the minimum wage 
were all very large. This is a good indication of a problem of regression to the 
mean. In order to confirm this finding, we used a different control variable, 
which is not suspect of generating regression to the mean, to proxy position in 
the earnings distribution. The obvious selection is education. Results of this 
exercise are presented in the Appendix (Table A6). Coefficients turn out much 
smaller, particularly for those groups that presumably compose the lower 
segments of the wage distribution, that is, individuals with complete secondary 
or less. This confirms the evidence of a regression to the mean problem for the 
bottom section of the distribution. The next step is, of course, to correct it.  
In order to correct this problem we follow the analysis of covariance 
method (Vickers and Altman 2001, Barnett et al. 2005). Thus, we modify our 
specification as follows: 
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8 In effect, it is typical in clinical trials, where a measurable variable of interest, such as blood pressure, 
cholesterol, weight or blood-sugar levels, can be ranked and analysis of the impact of treatment on the 
extremes of the distribution is important. See Davies (1976), Barnett et al. (2005), Bland and Altman (1994, 
1994a), inter alia. On the economics front, see Friedman (1992). 
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Results are presented in the following Table 2 and are consistent with those 
obtained with our prior specification.9 Statistical significance declines 
somewhat and, as expected, the coefficients are smaller. Implicit elasticities 
are around 2 for wage earners at the bottom of the distribution and 1 for those 
trapped between minima. The significant effect on independent workers at the 
bottom vanishes. 
Table 2: Effects of 12% increase of the minimum wage on monthly earnings, 
covariance analysis (from regression output) 
 Private  
Salaried 
 
Informal  
Private  
Salaried 
 Formal 
Private  
Salaried 
Independent 
Affect].25 - .6]*MW1 0.238 0.271  -0.128 
 (2.45)** (2.42)**  (1.33) 
Affect].6 - .95]*MW1 0.036 0.054  -0.039 
 (0.60) (0.77)  (0.56) 
Affect].95 - 1.2]*MW1 0.010 -0.035 0.127 -0.011 
 (0.22) (0.60) (1.77)* (0.12) 
Affect]1.2 - 1.5]*MW1 -0.035 -0.023 -0.055 -0.013 
 (0.91) (0.40) (1.11) (0.18) 
Affect]1.5 - 2]*MW1 -0.014 -0.010 -0.015 0.070 
 (0.40) (0.17) (0.37) (0.75) 
Affect]2 – 2.5]*MW1 -0.000 0.096 -0.062 -0.196 
 (0.00) (1.19) (1.24) (1.56) 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; 
**significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Probability of staying employed 
Table 3 sets out estimated discrete effects on the probability of retaining 
employed status. These were calculated from the regression coefficients, 
considering the individual’s earnings range and the rest of variables at sample 
means. 
Coefficients are uniformly negative, though most are not statistically 
significant. We find weakly significant effects on informal salaried workers 
earning below 0.6 of the initial minimum wage. The coefficient is large, 
                                                 
9 Table A5 in the Appendix presents both regressions, with and without correcting for regression to the mean 
for the purpose of comparison. 
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implying an elasticity of around 1 in absolute value. For those ‘trapped’ 
between the previous and the new minimum wage levels effects are also 
significant, but, contrastingly, these are driven by wage earners in the formal 
sector (the effect on the informal sector is significant only at the 14% level). 
Consequently, the implicit elasticities are similar for total salaried and for 
formal workers, -0.75. Effects are similar in size for formal workers earning up 
to 2 minimum wages as well as for informal workers just above the minimum. 
For the latter, both significance and the size of the effect weaken as we move 
to the 1.5-2 minima earnings range. 
Independent workers earning below 90 percent of the minimum wage are 
also negatively affected in their employment prospects by the increase. The 
size of the effect is similar to that for wage earners in the lower range of the 
distribution. 
Table 3: Discrete effects on the probability of retaining employed status 
(calculated from regression coefficients at sample means) 
Income Range/ 
RMV 
Private Salaried Informal Private 
Salaried 
Formal Private 
Salaried 
Independents 
].25-.6] -0.106** -0.120*  -0.104* 
].6-.95] -0.006 -0.024  -0.075** 
].95-1.2] -0.102** -0.081 -0.090** -0.106 
]1.2-1.5] -0.083*** -0.091*** -0.096** -0.029 
]1.5-2] -0.068*** -0.054* -0.096** -0.032* 
]2-2.5] -0.035* -0.043 -0.053 -0.073 
]2.5-3] -0.054  -0.086  
Notes: Asterisks indicate statistical significance: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
8. Discussion 
 
Our results are somewhat at odds with those of studies for other Latin 
American countries using similar methodologies. Specifically, we fail to find 
either significant effects throughout the wage distribution (numeraire effects) 
or strong effects in the informal sector (“lighthouse” effects), as Fejnzylver 
(2001) or Maloney and Nuñez (2004) found for Brazil and Colombia, 
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respectively. Effects on labor earnings are significant only at the bottom of the 
distribution, where informal workers dominate, and (weakly) for formal 
workers trapped between the old and the new minimum wage levels. 
Unemployment effects are significant only for total wage labor and those in 
the informal sector (weakly) with earnings below 0.6 of the minimum wage, 
but significant for those in the ranges between 0.95 and 2 minimum wages (as 
of the initial period). Among those trapped between minima, effects are 
significant only on the formal salaried, but in the two following ranges there 
are also effects on the informal, though weak for those in the 1.5-2 range. 
Independent workers below the minimum also suffer unemployment effects, 
particularly those in the .6-.95 range. 
Thus, we find little support for lighthouse effects in Peru in the short run. 
This should not be all that surprising, since theoretically it is not clear why 
such effects should be strong, particularly in a sector that is by definition 
outside the reach of labor regulations. Card and Krueger (1995) have stressed 
the informational qualities of the minimum wage to account for zero or 
positive employment effects. However, in Latin America employment effects 
tend to be negative. The alternative explanation proposed is that notions of 
‘fair pay’ are attached to the minimum wage (Maloney and Nuñez, 2004). If 
this is the case, it is likely that perceptions of the minimum wage may vary 
with local conditions, generally, and with the features of minimum wage 
policy, specifically. In this direction, when comparing Peru with Colombia and 
Brazil, one finds contrasting institutional features in regards to minimum wage 
policy. While in the latter countries this policy has been consistently pursued, 
in Peru its recent course, after the hyperinflation experience, has been rather 
erratic. Large increases in the wage floor have been followed by periods with 
no adjustments. Further, there is no institutional mechanism at work to discuss 
changes, as these have come as momentous presidential decisions. Under these 
conditions any signaling effects have to be weak, particularly in the short run. 
An additional aspect where our results somewhat depart from others is in 
the size of responses. This led us to suspect and subsequently confirm a 
problem of regression towards the mean. Even after correcting for this effect, 
our coefficients tend to be rather large where significant, with implicit 
earnings elasticities around 2 for those at the bottom of the distribution, which 
compare with 1.7 for Colombia and 1.4 for Brazil. Also, employment 
elasticities go from 0.5 to 0.75 in absolute value. One possible explanation for 
this, in line with our previous argument, is that if agents have internalized the 
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rule (as they seem to have done in Brazil or Colombia), they must come to 
expect a periodic variation in the official minimum wage. In effect, in both of 
these countries, minimum wage levels are adjusted on a yearly basis. If 
employers anticipate the change, or a portion of it, effects should be smaller, 
since adjustments may have been made in advance. An unanticipated shock is 
likely to have a larger effect. 
One final important point is related to the effect on low-income 
independent workers, as they do not obtain any gain in earnings, yet suffer 
unemployment consequences. In a general equilibrium model, lower earnings 
may be related to increased competition deriving from the unemployment 
effects in the wage earning sectors if displaced workers move to the 
independent sector. In turn, the reduction in relative earnings of independent 
workers may encourage flows out of the sector into either job searching in the 
salaried sector or inactivity. At this point, however, we cannot test this 
hypothesis. More generally, our results raise the question of the type of 
interactions between the formal and informal wage labor, and the independent 
sectors. The study of transitions between these sectors under different settings 
seems like a promising avenue to better understand labor market adjustments 
to minimum wage as well as other types of shocks when compliance is both 
incomplete and endogenous. 
 
9. Conclusions 
 
Within a context of erratic management, the statutory minimum wage in 
Peru has gone from low, largely non-binding levels to very high levels in a 
rather short period of time. The kernel distributions show very clearly how the 
minimum wage has shifted from far on the left to close to the center of the 
earnings distributions. Within this context, the evidence presented on 
minimum wage effects in the formal and informal sector is mixed. On the one 
hand, graphic analysis suggests that when the minimum wage is at a low level, 
it affects primarily the distribution of monthly earnings in the informal sector. 
When the minimum wage is binding, however, it has an effect on the 
distribution of earnings of formal sector workers. Evidence seems somewhat 
less conclusive on whether it plays a role in the informal sector distribution, 
however, though on balance we are inclined to conclude that there is indeed 
some effect. 
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 On the other hand, econometric analysis indicates that short run effects of 
minimum wage shocks are different in the formal and informal sectors. In the 
informal sector earnings are affected only at the bottom of the distribution. In 
the formal sector, we identify significant effects only on those caught between 
old and new minima. Unemployment effects among informal workers earning 
below the new minimum wage are only weakly significant. Workers earning in 
the range of 1.2 to 2 minimum wages in both formal and informal sectors are 
affected, but those trapped are affected only if in the formal sector. 
Independent workers earning below the minimum are also affected. Thus, we 
find little evidence of either numeraire or lighthouse effects in the short run. 
This, of course, does not mean that informal sector workers are untouched by 
minimum wage. Clearly, some of them are, even in the short run. Thus, though 
the minimum wage is not a lighthouse in Peru, it nonetheless provides some 
signaling in the long run.  
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Appendix 
 
Figure A1: Statutory Minimum Wages, 1991-2004 
(nuevos soles) 
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Table A1: Data sets used in Kernel estimates 
Year Data set Number of observations 
1996 ENAHO; quarter III 1467 
1997 ENAHO; quarter III 1028 
1999 ENAHO; quarter III 727 
2000 ENAHO; quarter III 720 
2003 EPE; quarter II 3294 
2004 EPE; quarter II 3418 
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Table A2: Sample for earnings variation regression 
 
 Total private 
salaried 
Informal salaried Formal salaried Independents 
 Not affc Affected Not affc Affected Not affc Affected Not affc Affected 
2 ].25 - .6]*MW1 269 27 236 24 33 3 367 40 
3 ].6 - .95]*MW1 584 79 520 70 64 9 462 83 
4 ].95 - 
1.2]*MW1 
1034 148 733 105 301 43 389 52 
5 ]1.2 - 
1.5]*MW1 
1601 207 992 114 609 93 485 67 
6 ]1.5 - 2]*MW1 1704 244 823 118 881 126 348 44 
7 ]2 - 2.5]*MW1 918 137 390 51 528 86 189 24 
8 ]2.5 - 3]*MW1 477 65 181 23 296 42 66 9 
9 ]3 - 4]*MW1 510 52 135 13 375 39 73 5 
10 ]4 - 5]*MW1 263 33 54 3 209 30 35 5 
11 ]5 - +]*MW1 669 93 98 5 571 88 64 6 
Total 8029 1085 4162 526 3867 559 2478 335 
  
Table A3: Sample for probability of retaining employment regression 
 
 Total private 
salaried 
Informal salaried Formal salaried Independents 
 Not affc Affected Not affc Affected Not affc Affected Not affc Affecte
2 ].25 - .6]*MW1 444 57 391 50 53 7 572 64 
3 ].6 - .95]*MW1 901 116 804 107 97 9 678 119 
4 ].95 - 1.2]*MW1 1473 218 1,080 159 393 59 565 76 
5 ]1.2 - 1.5]*MW1 2074 277 1,313 164 761 113 764 
6 ]1.5 - 2]*MW1 2198 321 1,131 168 1,067 153 548 73 
7 ]2 - 2.5]*MW1 1199 179 531 73 668 106 293 35 
8 ]2.5 - 3]*MW1 626 95 250 39 376 56 122 
9 ]3 - 4]*MW1 661 81 190 30 471 51 103 
10 ]4 - 5]*MW1 338 38 86 5 252 33 50 5 
11 ]5 - +]*MW1 811 104 123 7 688 97 89 8 
Total 10,725 1,486 5,899 802 4,826 684 3,784 514 
107 
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10 
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Table A4: Probability of retaining employment regression output 
affect  ]5-+]*MW1 -0.050  -0.059  
Elementary complete -0.030 -0.076 0.076 -0.048 
Secondary complete -0.028 -0.037 -0.050 -0.174* 
Post-secondary complete 0.026 -0.032 0.033 -0.279*** 
Age 0.054*** 0.056*** 0.055*** 0.038*** 
Age squared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
6 - 49 workers -0.031 -0.032 0.022  
50 + workers 0.086** -0.036 0.201***  
Quarter  I - II 0.292*** 0.389*** 0.137 -0.210** 
Quarter  II - III 0.092** 0.148*** 0.023 -0.202** 
Quarter  III - IV 0.131*** 0.162*** 0.091 -0.094 
Var% GDP, activ. t=1 0.065 -0.132 0.538** 0.036 
at least 3 mths, current job -0.423*** -0.387*** -0.547*** -0.444*** 
Female -0.172*** -0.201*** -0.144*** -0.287*** 
w/MW*range].25-.6] -0.038 -0.132 0.584 1.003* 
w/MW*range].6-.95] 0.167 0.144 0.437 0.177 
w/MW*range].95-1.2] 0.810* 0.939* 0.045 1.348* 
w/MW*range]1.2-1.5] 0.144 0.029 0.291 0.251 
Dependent variable: 
Probability of retaining 
employment [Probit] 
Private  
Salaried  
Informal 
 Private  
Salaried  
Formal 
Private  
Salaried  
Independents 
 
].25-.6]*MW1 -0.406 -0.725 -0.294 0.193 
].6-.95]*MW1 -0.406 -0.753 -0.208 0.615 
].95-1.2]*MW1 -1.010 -1.535 0.333 -0.442 
]1.2-1.5]*MW1 -0.153 -0.371 0.125 0.355 
]1.5-2]*MW1 -0.376 -0.500 -0.082 1.227 
]2.5-3]*MW1 -0.997 -1.416 -0.587 -0.083 
]3-4]*MW1 0.151 0.422 0.397 -0.226 
]4-5]*MW1 1.822 2.768 1.209 1.958 
]5-+]*MW1 0.001 -0.077 0.424 0.864 
affect  ].25-.6]*MW1 -0.395** -0.382*  -0.331* 
affect  ].6-.95]*MW1 -0.028 -0.084  -0.346** 
affect  ].95-1.2]*MW1 -0.272** -0.203 -0.460** -0.267 
affect  ]1.2-1.5]*MW1 -0.397*** -0.391*** -0.404** -0.115 
affect  ]1.5-2]*MW1 -0.275*** -0.223* -0.344** -0.348* 
affect  ]2-2.5]*MW1 -0.228* -0.305 -0.215 -0.214 
affect  ]2.5-3]*MW1 -0.147  -0.234  
affect  ]3-4]*MW1 -0.388**  -0.378  
affect  ]4-5]*MW1 0.125  0.497  
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Table A.4 (continued) 
Dependent variable: 
Probability of retaining 
employment [Probit] 
Private  
Salaried  
Informal 
 Private  
Salaried  
Formal 
Private  
Salaried  
Independents 
 
w/MW*range]1.5-2] 0.185 -0.001 0.343 -0.240 
w/MW*range]2-2.5] -0.019 -0.171 0.188 0.494 
w/MW*range]2.5-3] 0.350 0.347 0.396 0.270 
w/MW*range]3-4] -0.067 -0.259 -0.008 0.341 
w/MW*range]4-5] -0.419 -0.767* -0.154 -0.228 
w/MW*range]5-+] -0.003 -0.021 -0.001 -0.013 
Constant 0.299 0.661 -0.268 0.110 
Observations 12211 6701 5510 4298 
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 
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Table A6: Earnings variation regression outputs with interactions between 
educational level and being affected by change in MW  
Dependent variable 
% variation in monthly 
earnings from primary 
Private  
Salaried  
 
Informal 
 Private  
Salaried  
Formal 
Private  
Salaried  
Independents 
 
     
].25-.6]*MW1 1.899*** 1.632*** 1.796*** 2.240*** 
].6-.95]*MW1 1.267*** 0.951*** 1.316*** 1.643*** 
].95-1.2]*MW1 0.945*** 0.431 1.689*** 1.277* 
]1.2-1.5]*MW1 0.828*** 0.334 1.265*** 0.959 
]1.5-2]*MW1 0.591*** 0.284 0.792*** 0.689 
]2.5-3]*MW1 0.236 0.035 0.335 0.693 
]3-4]*MW1 0.378 -0.229 0.708** 0.583 
]4-5]*MW1 -0.361 -1.023 -0.014 1.004 
]5-+]*MW1 0.223 -0.246 0.479** 0.225 
Elem. complete 0.097** 0.098* 0.094 0.072 
Second. incomp 0.092** 0.097** 0.086 0.025 
Second. complete 0.162*** 0.161*** 0.138** 0.151*** 
Post second. No univ. 
incomp. 
0.198*** 0.226*** 0.135* 0.104 
Post second. No univcompl 0.267*** 0.281*** 0.213*** 0.241*** 
Post second. univ. incomp. 0.256*** 0.269*** 0.199*** 0.202** 
Post second. univ. Compl. 0.360*** 0.386*** 0.294*** 0.485*** 
affect  _Elem. incomp. o 
menos 
-0.042 -0.063 0.116 0.021 
affect  _Elem. Complete 0.031 0.026 0.060 -0.168 
affect  _Second. Incomp 0.140*** 0.119* 0.166* 0.019 
affect  _Second. Complete 0.024 0.078** -0.058 -0.069 
affect  _Post second. No 
univ. incomp. 
-0.088 -0.118 -0.079 0.015 
affect  _Post second. No 
univ. compl 
-0.066 -0.067 -0.064 -0.293* 
affect  _Post second. univ. 
incomp. 
0.016 -0.052 0.064 -0.111 
affect  _Post second. univ. 
compl 
-0.046 -0.076 -0.032 -0.147 
Age 0.018*** 0.021*** 0.012*** 0.022*** 
Age squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
6 - 49 workers 0.013 -0.015 0.027 0.000 
50 + workers 0.048*** 0.013 0.012 0.000 
Quarter  I - II -0.045** -0.041 -0.041 -0.159*** 
Quarter  II - III -0.025 0.001 -0.048** -0.118*** 
Quarter  III - IV -0.008 0.032 -0.040* -0.087** 
Var% GDP, activ. t=1 -0.052 0.028 -0.152** 0.058 
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Table A6 (continued) 
Dependent variable 
% variation in monthly 
earnings from primary 
Private  
Salaried  
 
Informal 
 Private  
Salaried  
Formal 
Private  
Salaried  
Independents 
 
at least 3 mths, current job -0.059*** -0.047** -0.032 -0.057 
Female -0.110*** -0.156*** -0.081*** -0.311*** 
w/MW*range].25-.6] -1.734*** -1.968*** -0.832 -1.827*** 
w/MW*range].6-.95] -0.626*** -0.690*** -0.363 -1.058*** 
w/MW*range].95-1.2] -0.359** -0.214 -0.874*** -0.645* 
w/MW*range]1.2-1.5] -0.233** -0.130 -0.413*** -0.379* 
w/MW*range]1.5-2] -0.121* -0.173* -0.099 -0.214 
w/MW*range]2-2.5] 0.154* -0.033 0.264*** 0.133 
w/MW*range]2.5-3] 0.014 -0.070 0.070 -0.179 
w/MW*range]3-4] -0.040 0.005 -0.063 -0.118 
w/MW*range]4-5] 0.132* 0.183 0.107 -0.108 
w/MW*range]5-+] -0.011*** -0.017* -0.011*** -0.030 
Constant -0.909*** -0.602** -0.896*** -0.842 
Observations 9114 4688 4426 2813 
R2 0.13 0.16 0.10 0.23 
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 
 
 
MINIMUM WAGE EFFECTS UNDER ENDOGENOUS COMPLIANCE 123 
MINIMUM WAGE EFFECTS UNDER ENDOGENOUS 
COMPLIANCE: EVIDENCE FROM PERU 
 
MIGUEL JARAMILLO BAANANTE 
 
SUMMARY 
 
JEL Classification: J23, J38, O17 
 
Latin American labor markets feature large informal sectors. In practice, however, the 
simple duality formal-informal has many different shades: firms tend to comply more 
with certain legislation than with other. Recent evidence has suggested that minimum 
wages have significant effects on the informal sector (Bell (1997) for Mexico; 
Gindling and Terrell (2004) for Costa Rica; Lemos (2004) and Fajnzylver (2001) for 
Brazil; and Maloney and Nuñez (2004) for Colombia). Further, some of this evidence 
suggests effects throughout a large part of the wage distribution. This has been 
interpreted as evidence of ‘lighthouse’ or numeraire effects. We test this hypothesis 
using panel data from Peru to identify effects throughout the wage distribution. 
Although there are some effects on informal sector workers, overall results provide 
little support for numeraire or ‘lighthouse’ effects. Labor monthly earnings are 
affected only at the bottom of the distribution (0.25-0.60 of the minimum wage), made 
up mostly of informal workers, and for formal workers earning between the old the 
new minima. Negative effects on the probability of retaining employed status after a 
minimum wage shock are either weak or non significant for wage earners below the 
minimum wage, but significant for formal workers ‘trapped’ between minima, and for 
both formal and informal earning between 1.2 and 2 times the minimum wage. 
Independent workers earning below minimum suffer negative effects on both earnings 
and employment. 
 
